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Criminal Courts and Tribunals
International Criminal Court
Fourth State Party to the Rome
Statute Ratifies Crime
of Aggression Amendment
Luxembourg recently became the fourth
State Party of the International Criminal
Court (ICC, Court) to ratify amendments
to the Rome Statute that were adopted in
a historic consensus at the 2010 Review
Conference of the International Criminal
Court in Kampala, Uganda. The January
15, 2013 ratification brings the controversial amendments another step closer to
entering into force. If the requisite number
of states ratify the proposed amendments,
the ICC’s jurisdiction would dramatically
increase in scope, likely having profound
global implications for current armed
conflicts.
Although the Rome Statute included
the crime of aggression within the Court’s
jurisdiction at its inception, the Court has
been unable to exercise its jurisdiction
as the original Statute failed to define
the crime or its jurisdictional boundaries.
The inclusion of the crime of aggression
in Article 5, while lacking a functional
definition and jurisdictional details, was
part of a compromise reached during the
negotiation of the Rome Statute in 1998.
However, on June 11, 2010, the delegates
of the Review Conference of the Rome
Statute adopted amendments that included
a definition of the crime of aggression
and established conditions for the Court’s
jurisdiction.
The amendments adopted in Kampala
include Article 8 which defines the crime
of aggression for the purpose of the Rome
Statute. The text of Article 8(1) states that
the crime of aggression must be conducted
by a person effectively controlling the
political or military action of a state and
is “the planning, preparation, initiation
or execution […] of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the
Charter of the United Nations.” The term
“act of aggression” is defined in Article
8(2) bis as the “use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial

integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.” Notably, this definition refers
back to the UN Charter throughout the
text, reflecting compromises made to limit
the scope of the definition.
The adopted amendments also include
Article 15 bis and 15 ter, the conditions for
the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. According to Article
15 bis, for the crime of aggression, the
prosecutor could only open an investigation
proprio motu or one based on a state
referral of a situation, after ascertaining
whether the UN Security Council has made
a determination of an act of aggression
committed by the state concerned. If the
Security Council has made such a determination, then the prosecutor may initiate
the investigation. If the Security Council
has not made such a determination within
six months of the date of notification,
then the prosecutor may commence the
investigation only if the Pre-Trial Chamber
has authorized it and the Security Council
has not decided against recognition of an
act of aggression.
The idea of a crime of aggression,
while treated as a novel idea by many
States Parties to the Rome Statute, is not
at all a new concept within international
law. Article 1 of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact, known as the General Treaty for
the Renunciation of War, declared, “The
High Contracting Parties solemnly declare
in the names of their respective peoples
that they condemn recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies,
and renounce it, as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one
another.” With the commencement of the
Nuremburg Tribunal in 1950, an international court actually applied its jurisdiction
to the crime of aggression though it used the
term “crimes against peace.” The definition
of crimes against peace adopted in
the Nuremburg principles comprises
“planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or
assurances.”
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Along with the ideas promulgated
at Nuremburg, the UN Charter, adopted
in 1945, prohibited the use of armed
force against another state in Article 2(4).
Although international law had customarily
protected the sovereignty of states, including
their right to use armed force against another,
the UN Charter, along with Nuremburg,
suggest an evolving intent to limit the
legitimate use of armed forces to situations
of self-defense, although international
humanitarian law has yet to place such
strict limits in all cases. The new amendments to the Rome Statue would take steps
toward reinforcing these limitations on the
use of armed force and can be seen as an
attempt to further the principles endorsed
by Nuremburg—the end to global conflicts
that result in mass casualties and the ability
to hold individuals accountable for their
actions in these atrocities.

ICC Withdraws Charges Against
Former Kenyan Official
The International Criminal Court’s
(ICC) Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, filed a
motion in March 2013 to drop all charges
against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, the former
Head of the Public Service and Secretary
to the Cabinet of the Republic of Kenya,
a co-accused of Kenya’s recently elected
President, Uhuru Kenyatta. Muthaura and
Kenyatta were jointly accused of five
counts of crimes against humanity for
their alleged involvement in authorizing
and organizing the wave of violence that
swept through Kenya following contested
presidential elections in late 2007. All
five counts are included in Article 7(1)
of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which
defines crimes against humanity as certain
acts “committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack.” Specifically, Muthaura and
Kenyatta were charged with murder,
deportation or forcible transfer, rape,
persecution, and other inhumane acts
resulting in the death of more than 1,000
civilians and the displacement of more
than 600,000 more. In Bensouda’s statement on the notice to withdraw charges
against Muthaura, she stressed that it was
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her duty to do so when there is no longer
a reasonable prospect of conviction at trial.
In the wake of the worst unrest in
Kenya since its independence in 1963,
Muthaura has been accused of authorizing
police to use excessive force against protesters, protected members of the Party of
National Unity’s youth militia, and also
of attending meetings in which attacks
on civilians were planned. On March 31,
2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the
prosecution’s request to initiate an investigation into crimes of humanity committed
by Muthaura and Kenyatta. Subsequently,
the case was referred to Trial Chamber V
on March 29, 2012. Under Article 61(9)
of the Rome Statute, “after commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may,
with the permission of the Trial Chamber,
withdraw the charges” against the accused.
There is no further guidance within the
Statute itself on what conditions must
be met for the withdrawal of charges or
how charges are withdrawn procedurally.
On March 11, 2013, Bensouda issued
a statement on her notice to withdraw
charges against Muthaura, in which she
cited several reasons for the withdrawal,
including witnesses’ death or refusal to
testify due to fear, the lack of support from
the government of Kenya in providing
critical evidence and facilitating access
to witnesses, and most importantly the
fact that the key witness—witness number
four—recanted a crucial part of his statement and admitted to accepting bribes.
Bensouda stressed that this decision
has no bearing on the charges against
President-elect Kenyatta, and stated: “My
decision today is based on the specific
facts of the case against Mr. Muthaura,
and not on any other consideration. While
we are all aware of political developments in Kenya, these have no influence,
at all, on the decisions I make as the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court.” However, at the hearing in which
Trial Chamber V officially dropped the
charges against Muthaura, Kenyatta’s
lawyers urged the Chamber to drop the
charges of crimes against humanity against
their client, claiming the charges were
based on hearsay and were fundamentally
flawed. According to Article 27 of the
Rome Statute, should Kenyatta take office
while there are still charges against him at
the ICC, he will not receive any type of
head of state immunity. Kenyatta’s lawyers
have argued that the entire case should be

returned to the Pre-Trial Chamber because
the prosecution’s case has changed drastically in the past year as certain evidence
no longer exists and a high percentage of
new evidence and undisclosed witnesses
have been offered. Lawyers representing
victims of the violence fear that if Kenyatta
does take power, there could be widespread retaliation for cooperating with
the prosecution and serious danger for
witnesses against him.
The democratic election of an alleged
criminal accused of grave human rights
abuses presents a seemingly monumental
problem for the International Criminal
Court, which has had a shaky history since
its inception ten years ago. Many have
criticized the Court as being too Africanfocused, not effective enough, and an
enduring symbol of western colonialism
—criticisms Kenyatta capitalized on in
the election by using his indictment as
a way to gather popular support. The
decision of the Prosecutor to withdraw the
charges against Muthaura due to lack of
evidence could be seen as an example of
the inefficiencies of the Court. However it
could also serve as an important reminder
about the rule of law and the protections of
defendant’s rights that are essential to any
fair justice system.
Tracy French, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Internationalized Criminal
Tribunals
Witness Identity Leaks in the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Lead to Investigation and Possible
Contempt Charges
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL) came under political scrutiny in
January for leaking the identities of witnesses in the upcoming trials surrounding
the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The source of
the leak is unknown, although the names,
photographs, and identifying information
of the witnesses were published in the
local Al Akhbar newspaper, known for
being aligned with the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon. The STL quickly issued
a statement in which it “denounce[d] in
the strongest possible terms any attempts
at witness intimidation.” Al Akhbar, in an
70

article titled The STL Witness List: Why
We Published, justified the release of the
names and photographs, saying that the
public has a right to know the identities
of those testifying against the accused.
Concerns about witness intimidation further complicate public opinion regarding
the already-controversial trial, which will
try the four accused in abstentia.
In April 2013, the Pre-Trial Judge
determined that these leaks likely constituted contempt of court and asked the
President of the tribunal to refer the matter
to a Contempt Judge. In accordance with
a March 2013 calendar assigning one
Contempt Judge and one Appeals Panel
for each month of the year, the President
of the STL, Judge David Baragwanath,
was designated as the Contempt Judge
in this matter. After the April 25, 2013,
hearing on the contempt allegations, Judge
Baragwanath issued a decision ordering
the appointment of an independent amicus
curiae to investigate the source of the leaks
and those who published the confidential
information. Rule 60 bis allows the STL
to hold individuals found in contempt of
court, meaning those who “knowingly and
willingly interfere with its administration
of justice” or “those who threaten and
intimidate witnesses,” responsible through
sentences up to seven years in prison and
fines up to 100,000 Euros.
Other international criminal tribunals have suffered similar challenges
to the proper administration of justice.
Most notably, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
faced comparable issues involving leaks
and publication of witness names and identifying information. In the Celebici case,
tried in 1997, the tribunal was adjourned
for over a week while the Office of the
Prosecutor investigated leaks. Although
the prosecutor identified members of the
defense counsel as the sources of the leak
to the publication Sloboda Herzegovina,
the President of the Tribunal, Judge
Antonio Cassese, concluded that there
was not enough evidence to hold defense
attorneys in contempt of court. However,
Judge Cassese noted that the defendant,
Zejnil Delalic, may have spoken to the
press himself and, in doing so, may have
been in contempt of court. The tribunal
accepted Judge Cassese’s findings regarding the defense counselors but rejected
the implication that Delalic should be
investigated for contempt of court. In
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2012, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
affirmed former Serbian leader Vojislav
Seselj’s sentence of eighteen months in
jail for publishing the names of protected
who testified in his trial before the ICTY.
The defendant disclosed the names and
pseudonyms of witnesses on his website
and in his 2007 book. The Contempt Trial
Chamber found Seselj guilty of contempt
of court in October 2011 and ordered that
the defendant remove the names and the
book from his website.
Witness testimony before international
criminal tribunals in cases of war crimes
and crimes against humanity is essential to
the pursuit of the truth and the administration of justice, but it can also be dangerous
and difficult. The individuals on trial may
be politically or militarily powerful, and
witnesses risk being identified when they
agree to testify before an international
tribunal. For this reason, the STL’s Rules
of Procedure and Evidence strictly outline witness protection procedures, which
become effective as soon as individuals
enter their applications to become witnesses. From this moment onward, the
tribunal incurs a duty to “ensure security,
safety and protection of victims and witnesses, as well as to respect their confidentiality” and the tribunal becomes
responsible for implementing “protective
measures to ensure witnesses are able
to testify in court without fears about
their safety, security, and confidentiality.”
Rule 133 of STL’s Rules of Procedure
and Evidence outlines steps to guard the
identity of the witnesses, including the use
of pseudonyms in written accounts of the
trial, facial distortion in public broadcast
of the proceedings, and voice distortion
in public broadcast. To limit the exposure during the trial, the proceedings are
generally closed to the public during the
presentation of evidence, and witnesses are
permitted to give testimony via video link
instead of being present in the courtroom.
In an effort to decrease the opportunity
for disclosure, identifying information is
expunged from the public record, including the court transcript, and the chamber
may limit the time each party has access
to the identities of the witnesses of the
opposing party. If counsel for either side
feels that the witness is at imminent risk
of death or serious harm, he or she may
apply to the registrar for entry of the witness into the tribunal’s protection program,
under which the individual would then be

relocated. Failures to respect or protect
confidentiality may result in contempt of
court, which potentially includes jail time.
Although the trial was set to begin at
the end of March, the STL indicated that
these leaks along with delays in disclosure
of evidence, required the tribunal to postpone the hearing, and the case is still in the
pre-trial phase.

French Court Invokes
Universal Jurisdiction
in Rwandan Genocide Case
In early April 2013, French prosecutors
announced the domestic trial of a former
captain in the Rwandan army for his
alleged involvement in the 1994 Rwandan
genocide. Citing universal jurisdiction,
prosecutors charged Pascal Simbikangwa,
who was arrested in 2008 by French
officials under an international arrest
warrant, with the crimes of “complicity
in genocide” and “complicity in crimes
against humanity.” This trial marks the
first attempt by the French government to
prosecute anyone in connection with the
Rwandan genocide. The trial order is a
response to a complaint filed by a group
formed by Rwandans living in France
called the Collective of Civil Plaintiffs
for Rwanda (CPCR). Simbikangwa was
a captain and intelligence officer with the
Rwandan military under the former Hutu
president Juvenal Habyarimana, whose
assassination triggered the mass atrocities
throughout the nation. French prosecutors
accuse Simbikangwa of being a member
of Akazu, a Hutu group of extremists
believed to have planned and executed the
genocide. Simbikangwa is also accused of
arming the Interahamwe Hutu militia and
facilitating the massacre of Tutsis.
Universal jurisdiction, the doctrine
under which certain crimes can be adjudicated in states in which the alleged
crime was not committed, usually only
applies if the judicial system that would
have jurisdiction is unable or unwilling
to conduct a fair and independent trial.
While this was the scenario that led to the
creation of the ICTR, with the tribunal’s
mandate coming to an end and the transfer
of cases to Rwandan domestic courts, this
is no longer the case.
France has repeatedly refused to extradite genocide suspects to Rwanda based on
the belief that detainees would not receive
a fair trial. However, instead of referring
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cases directly to the International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), in 2010
France created a unit of its ProsecutorGeneral’s Office tasked with investigating
suspects’ involvement in the genocide for
proceedings within the French judicial system. Even after the official transfer of the
ICTR’s cases to Rwanda’s domestic courts,
France officially indicted Simbikangwa in
its own courts. Simbikangwa’s attorneys
have not yet responded to the French
trial order, and it is unclear whether they
will attempt to appeal the decision and
challenge France’s jurisdiction.
Although the application of universal
jurisdiction to prosecute genocide suspects in domestic courts is not common,
similar indictments have been issued in
the past, leading to successful—though
controversial—trials, such as those conducted in Belgium in 2001. The Belgium
trial marked the first time that a jury was
asked to make a determination of guilt for
violations of international humanitarian
law in another country. However, France’s
choice to try a Rwandan genocide suspect in its domestic courts is particularly
unusual in 2013 because experts within
the ICTR and the United Nations have
determined Rwanda’s domestic courts to
be capable of providing fair and independent hearings for genocide suspects.
The ICTR also transferred its documents
and mandate to an intermediate court
called the Mechanism for International
Criminal Tribunals (MICT). The MICT is
responsible for concluding the remaining
cases open regarding crimes committed in
Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia. In
November 2012, Emmanuelle Ducos, the
vice president of the French tribunal dealing with Simbikangwa, formally requested
access to all confidential materials the
ICTR, and now the MICT, possess concerning the suspect. The MICT prosecutor
did not object to the request and the judge,
in a ruling on December 20, 2012, permitted the French tribunal access to some
documents while requiring witness consent
to release others. According to this ruling,
Simbikangwa’s case is no longer pending
before the ICTR or the MICT, meaning
that it is among the cases transferred to
Rwandan domestic courts for prosecution.
France’s decision to issue the trial order
was welcomed by Rwandan advocacy
groups; however, it also triggered calls
for further commitment to prosecution.
Jean de Dieu Mucyo, executive secretary
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of the National Commission Against the
Genocide, pointed to France’s refusal to
arrest and prosecute other genocide suspects in the state. In particular, Rwandan
groups have tried to put pressure on
France to arrest and prosecute Agathe
Habyarimana, the wife of former Rwandan
president Juvenal Habyarimana. She is
believed to have chaired the Akazu and

Judgment Summaries:
Criminal
ribunal for Rwanda

nternational

I
G
Taspard Kanyarukiga v. The
Prosecutor, Appeals Judgment,
Case No. ICTR 02-78-A
On May 8, 2012, the Appeals
Chamber for the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) affirmed
Trial Chamber II’s conviction of Gaspard
Kanyarukiga for planning genocide and
extermination as a crime against humanity
based on his role in the destruction of
the Nyange church on April 16, 1994,
which resulted in the deaths of approximately 2,000 Tutsi civilians. The Appeals
Chamber also affirmed his thirty-year
sentence of imprisonment.
Notably, Kanyarukiga asserted a total
of 72 grounds of appeal. Challenges were
grouped into four categories: alleged
violations of Kanyarukiga’s fair trial
rights, alleged errors relating to the
indictment, alleged errors related to
the rejection of the accused’s alibi, and
claims that the Trial Chamber engaged
in faulty assessments of the evidence.
With regard to the challenges based on
alleged violations of the accused’s fair
trial rights, Kanyarukiga claimed, inter
alia, that the Trial Chamber improperly denied his request for a stay of
proceedings, which had been based on
the argument that three laissez-passers
seized from the accused at the time of his
arrest had disappeared, making it impossible for the accused to establish his
alibi defense. In response, the Appeals
Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber
was not convinced that the evidence had
in fact been seized from the accused
and that, in any event, the accused could
establish his alibi defense through other
evidence, meaning that there was no
abuse of process such that proceeding
with the trial would “contravene the

used her economic and political influence to encourage the killing of Tutsis.
Last year, France granted her permanent
residency. As Simbikangwa’s trial moves
forward, Rwandan anti-genocide organizations, as well as Rwandan citizens throughout Europe, will assess this prosecution’s
implications for the future relationship
between France and Rwanda as well as

court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial
impropriety or misconduct.” The Appeals
Chamber agreed, concluding that the
lower court had not abused its discretion
by not ordering the requested stay and
noting that the burden was on the defense
to show that the accused had suffered an
abuse of process that damaged his fair
trial rights. The Appeals Chamber similarly rejected claims from the defense
that his fair trial rights were damaged
by the Trial Chamber’s alleged setting
of arbitrary time limits on the defense’s
cross-examinations or by the failure to
issue timely rulings on challenges to the
admissibility of prosecution evidence.
Again, the Appeals Chamber found that
these grounds were insufficient because
the defense failed to show that the Trial
Chamber erred in exercising its discretion and that the defense was prejudiced
as a result.
Concerning the alleged errors relating
to the indictment, the Appeals Chamber
dismissed all but one of the defense’s
challenges. Specifically, the Appeals
Chamber upheld Kanyarukiga’s claim that
the prosecution erred by failing to allege
in the indictment that Kanyarukiga had
engaged in a conversation with another
ICTR accused, Clément Kayishema,
concerning the destruction of the Nyange
church. According to the Appeals
Chamber, this conversation constituted
a material fact that, along with others,
underpinned Kanyarukiga’s conviction
for planning genocide and extermination.
The Appeals Chamber then recalled that
the prosecution is required to identify
in the indictment the “particular acts”
or the “particular course of conduct”
on the part of the accused that formed
the basis for the charge in question. The
absence of this information rendered the
indictment faulty. However, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that, because the
prosecution did properly include in the
indictment allegations relating to another
72

the success of any potential proceedings
against Simbikangwa in Rwandan domestic courts.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

“planning” conversation that took place
the following day, there was sufficient
basis for the Trial Chamber’s holding that
Kanyarukiga was responsible for planning the destruction of the church. Thus,
the lower court’s judgment was affirmed.
The defense’s challenges based
on alleged alibi error failed due to
the broad discretion afforded to the
Trial Chamber in evaluating factual
information presented at trial, with the
Appeals Chamber stressing that a “Trial
Chamber need not explain every step
of its reasoning.” Lastly, the Appeals
Chamber dismissed the allegations that
the Trial Chamber improperly evaluated
the evidence, a claim that largely rested
on challenges to the lower court’s decisions regarding witness credibility and
treatment of corroborating statements.
On this subject, the Appeals Chamber
stressed that that the Trial Chamber is best
placed to observe a witness’s demeanor
during testimony and to resolve any
inconsistencies that may arise within
or amongst witnesses’ testimonies, particularly given that the Trial Chamber
can consider whether the evidence taken
as a whole is reliable and credible. The
Appeals Chamber further held that the
testimony of two witnesses may be found
to corroborate one another if the two
testimonies are “compatible” regarding
a fact or sequence of facts, and that it
is not necessary that the testimonies be
identical in all aspects.
In addition to rejecting the vast
majority of the defense’s various
grounds of appeal, the Appeals Chamber
rejected the prosecution’s appeal that
the Trial Chamber erred in failing to
sentence the accused to life in prison.
The Appeals Chamber found that a
“sentence of [thirty] years’ imprisonment may be considered among the most
severe sentences,” and that it was not
“so unreasonable or plainly unjust” to
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require the Appeals Chamber’s intervention. The prosecution also appealed the
Trial Chamber’s finding that the evidence
proving that Kanyarukiga planned the
destruction of the Nyange church was
insufficient to establish that he “significantly contributed” to the destruction of
the church, which led the Trial Chamber
to conclude that it could not convict
the accused for participating in a joint
criminal enterprise aimed at destroying
the church. The majority of the Appeals
Chamber declined to rule on this ground
of appeal, noting that the prosecution did
not seek to invalidate the lower court’s
verdict but simply sought “clarification
on an issue of general importance to
the development of the Tribunal’s case
law.” However, Judge Pocar did write
a Separate Opinion, offering the clarification sought by the prosecution. He
noted that the Appeals Chamber has the
discretion to “hear appeals where a party
has raised a legal issue that would not
invalidate the judgment,” and explained
that “the clarification of [the] issue will
avoid uncertainty and confusion in future
cases.” Judge Pocar began his Separate
Opinion by recalling that all three categories of joint criminal-enterprise liability
share the following constitutive elements:
(i) a plurality of persons; (ii) the existence
of a common plan, design or purpose that
amounts to or involves the commission
of a crime provided for in the ICTR
Statute; and (iii) the participation of the
accused in the common purpose. He then
explained that the last element, participation, does not require the commission “of
a specific crime” but rather “may take the
form of assistance in, or contribution to,
the execution of the common purpose.”
In this case, as Judge Pocar recalled,
the Trial Chamber determined that “the
requisite contribution would have been
met if Kanyarukiga had ‘ordered, instigated, encouraged or provided material
assistance to the attackers’” at the church,
but that his role in planning the attack was
insufficient. Judge Pocar disagreed with
this conclusion, noting that the Appeals
Chamber for the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia held in the Tadić
case that “[a]lthough only some members
of the group may physically perpetrate
the criminal act (murder, extermination,
wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, etc.), the participation and

contribution of the other members of
the group is often vital in facilitating
the commission of the offence in question.” Indeed, according to Judge Pocar,
planning a crime involves “designing the
criminal conduct” constituting the statutory crimes “that are later perpetrated.”
Thus, in his opinion, planning a crime
may amount to a significant contribution
to the execution of a common purpose.
Ultimately, having rejected the
majority of appeals from both the prosecution and the defense, the Appeals
Chamber affirmed Trial Chamber II’s
conviction of Kanyarukiga for planning
genocide and extermination as a crime
against humanity, as well as his thirtyyear sentence of imprisonment.
Martha Branigan-Sutton, an L.L.M.
candidate at the American University
Washington College of Law, wrote this
summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Katherine Cleary Thompson, Assistant
Director of the War Crimes Research
Office, edited this summary for the
Human Rights Brief.

Aloys Ntabakuze v. The
Prosecutor, Appeals Judgment,
Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A
On May 8, 2012, the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) issued a decision
on the appeal of Aloys Ntabakuze, the
Commander of the Para-Commando
Battalion of the Rwandan Army. Trial
Chamber I had convicted Ntabakuze
based on its findings that he bore
superior responsibility for a number of
crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Specifically, the lower court
convicted the accused of genocide; the
crimes against humanity of extermination,
persecution, murder, and other inhumane
acts; and violence to life as a serious
violation of the Geneva Convention and
its Additional Protocol II, as incorporated
into the ICTR statute. The convictions
were based on three different incidents
that occurred in April 1994: (i) the killing
of Tutsis in the Kabeza area of Kigali on
April 7–8; (ii) the killing of Tutsis on
Nyanza Hill on April 11; and (iii) the
killing of Tutsis at the Institut Africain et
Mauricien de Statistiques et d’Économie
Appliquée (IAMSEA) in the Remera area
of Kigali on April 15. On appeal, the
73

Appeals Chamber unanimously reversed
Ntabakuze’s conviction for other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity
based on the events at Nyanza Hill, and
a majority of the Chamber reversed his
convictions for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes in relation to
the killings in Kabeza. Based on these
holdings, the Appeals Chamber vacated
Ntabakuze’s life sentence, replacing it
with a term of 35 years’ imprisonment.
Ntabakuze appealed his conviction on
37 grounds. Notably, Ntabakuze claimed
that his rights to a fair trial had been
violated in a number of ways, including
the prosecution’s failure to properly
inform him of the charges against him
until the end of trial and the prosecution’s
failure to observe disclosure obligations.
He also claims that in convicting him,
the Trial Chamber “relied solely on
unreasonable and hypothetical inferences
in violation of the principle of innocence.” However, the Appeals Chamber
dismissed each of these claims, finding
that the defense was not able to substantiate any of them.
Ntabakuze also claimed that his right
to be tried without undue delay had
been violated, stressing that he had been
detained twelve years by the time he filed
his Notice of Appeal. In response, the
Appeals Chamber recognized the “substantial length of the proceedings in the
case,” but noted that the Trial Chamber
had already rejected the defense’s claim
that his right to a speedy trial had been
violated in light of the “size and complexity of the trial.” According to the
Appeals Chamber, the mere length of
the accused’s detention did not show that
the Trial Chamber erred in reaching this
conclusion.
Another set of challenges brought
by the defense involved challenges to
the indictment. Specifically, Ntabakuze
alleged that the prosecution erred in not
putting him on notice regarding material
facts underpinning the charges against
him or regarding the mode of liability
upon which the prosecution based its
case. Before turning to the particulars
of these claims, the Appeals Chamber
recalled that “the charges against an
accused and the material facts supporting
those charges must be pleaded with sufficient precision in an indictment so as to
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provide notice to the accused,” and that
whether a fact is “material” depends “on
the nature of the [p]rosecution’s case.”
The Chamber also noted that a defective
indictment may be “cured” if “the [p]rosecution provides the accused with timely,
clear, and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the
charge.” Turning to the defense’s specific
claims, the Chamber found that although
the indictment was in fact defective with
respect to the charge that the accused
bore superior responsibility for killings committed in the town of Kabeza,
the prosecution had cured the defect
through information submitted in its PreTrial Brief and the Supplement thereto.
However, the Appeals Chamber also
found that the indictment failed to inform
Ntabakuze that the prosecutor was charging him as a superior for the crime against
humanity of other inhumane acts based
on his role of preventing refugees who
were killed at Nyanza Hill from seeking
sanctuary before being taken to the hill.
Furthermore, it found that the prosecution did not cure this defect by presenting
appropriate information regarding this
charge in subsequent filings, and that the
prosecution failed to prove that this lack
of information did not prevent Ntabakuze
from preparing an adequate defense to
the charge. Accordingly, the Appeals
Chamber vacated the lower court’s
conviction of Ntabakuze for the crime
against humanity of other inhumane
acts. The Appeals Chamber also found
that, although the prosecution generally provided the accused with sufficient
notice that he was being charged under
a theory of superior responsibility for
the actions of Para-Commando soldiers
who belonged to the battalion led by
Ntabakuze, the prosecution failed to sufficiently allege that he was responsible
for the acts of certain militiamen who
committed acts alongside these soldiers.

Thus, the Appeals Chamber reversed the
Trial Chamber’s findings to the extent
they relied on the actions of militiamen,
although this holding did not wholly
vacate any of the convictions because
each of the charges for which the accused
was convicted were supported by multiple allegations.
In addition to successfully challenging
certain aspects of the prosecution’s charging strategy, the defense convinced a
majority of the Appeals Chamber that the
Trial Chamber erred in concluding that
Ntabakuze bore superior responsibility
for the killings carried out by soldiers at
Kabeza. Specifically, while the majority found that the Trial Chamber acted
within its discretion in concluding that
the killings were carried out by members of the Para-Commando Battalion,
it was not satisfied that the lower court
adequately addressed evidence put
forward by the defense suggesting that
certain members of the Battalion were
serving under a commander other than
Ntabakuze. Because it was not clear from
the evidence which company of the battalion carried out the relevant attacks, the
majority of the Appeals Chamber vacated
the Trial Chamber’s convictions to the
extent they were based on actions carried
out at Kabeza. In a dissenting opinion,
Judges Pocar and Liu explained that they
were satisfied with the Trial Chamber’s
assessment of the evidence that led it
to conclude Ntabakuze exercised effective control over the perpetrators of the
attacks in Kabeza, that the defendant
knew that the attacks would be taking
place, and that he failed to prevent them.
Finally, the Appeals Chamber
dismissed each of the defense’s challenges to the Trial Chamber’s approach
to sentencing, a claim which had asserted
that the lower court erred (i) by choosing
a single sentence based upon multiple

74

convictions for the same acts; (ii) by
“double-counting” the accused’s role
as a superior both in determining his
responsibility for the crimes and as an
aggravating factor, as well as the number
of victims at Nyanza Hill in considering
the gravity of the accused’s crimes and
as an aggravating factor; and (iii) by
abusing its discretion by imposing a
life sentence. With regard to the first
claim, the Appeals Chamber stressed
that the “primary goal in sentencing
is to ensure that the final or aggregate
sentence reflects the totality of the criminal conduct and overall culpability of
the offender,” and it held that there was
nothing suggesting that the Trial Chamber
had not adduced its sentence according to
these principles. In relation to the second
claim, the Appeals Chamber disagreed
with the defense’s assessment that the
Trial Chamber had “double-counted” the
relevant factors, noting that the mere
discussion of these factors in its assessment of the sentence does not mean they
were relied upon by the Chamber more
than once. Lastly, the Appeals Chamber
held that, based on its holdings at trial,
the lower court acted within its discretion
to impose a life sentence, despite the
fact that the defense offered a number
of mitigating factors and even though
Ntabakuze was convicted on the basis of
superior responsibility rather than direct
perpetration. Nevertheless, given the fact
that the majority of the Appeals Chamber
vacated a number of the Trial Chamber’s
convictions, as discussed above, it
reduced Ntabakuze’s sentence from life
imprisonment to a term of 35 years.
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